Chapter I. A Characterisation of Postmodernism

Postmodernism and Mission. An Attempt at Synthesis — Chapter I. Quotations from Polish-language scholarship are given in the translator's English rendering; bibliographical references retain their original form.

Introduction

The phenomenon of postmodernism is a broad one, manifesting itself in a great many dimensions of human thought and culture, and carrying consequences in the concrete attitudes of contemporary people. It therefore seems necessary, at the outset of the present analysis of postmodernism, to indicate the framework within which it will proceed. The chapter below will present the genesis and the principal ideas of this current of thought as they are reflected in philosophical reflection, setting out its main assumptions. Those postmodern ideas will also be presented which can be counted among the points of interest it shares with theological reflection.

1. A General Characterisation of Postmodernism

Postmodernism as a phenomenon entered broader social consciousness several decades ago, though its genesis reaches back to the nineteenth century. The term postmoderne, describing this phenomenon, was first used by John Watkins Chapman around the year 1870¹, yet for a long time it found no wider currency in culture or in the sciences until the beginning of the 1960s². Authors give the phenomenon an inconsistent nomenclature: post-modernity, postmodernity, the postmodern, and even ultra-modernity³. A more recent systematisation separates postmodernism from postmodernity, assigning the former to everything relating to human thought (e.g. art, literature, philosophy), while the latter is used with reference to the cultural and civilisational transformations which came about after the collapse of modernity⁴. To make the terminology precise: in the present reflection the author will employ the terminology drawn from the Leksykon Teologii Fundamentalnej⁵, adopting the designation postmodernism as referring to the phenomenon under discussion.

The current itself, as the authors engaged in reflection on postmodernism emphasise, was not born without a prior genesis; it is rather the result of drawing conclusions from the most radical varieties of modernist philosophy⁶.

The event which popularised the use of this concept in the philosophical sciences was the publication in 1979 of the work La condition postmoderne by Jean-François Lyotard, which was an answer to the question of what changes should be expected in industrial society under the influence of new technologies of information transmission⁷. He advanced the view that postmodernism has its roots in the collapse of the three principal theses of the Enlightenment: faith in progress, the loss of a sense of the meaningfulness of history, and the cognitive subject–object opposition⁸.

Alongside J.-F. Lyotard, Jacques Derrida is named among the key figures influencing the development of the postmodern current of thought⁹. Although there is a dispute as to whether Derrida himself should be counted among the postmodern philosophers, his conceptions of post-structuralism and deconstructionism undoubtedly influenced the work of the postmodernists.

The later process of the development of reflection on the phenomenon of postmodernism was not characterised by any increasing precision as to the object of analysis. On the contrary, the very multiplicity of reflection on this idea meant that the authors who took it up understood the concept of postmodernism in diverse ways. This is a considerable barrier which hinders a full and comprehensive vision in research work on this current of thought: "Yet anyone who wishes to come to know postmodernism faces no small task. (…) The matter is difficult, and for at least several reasons. First, because postmodernism is a sack-concept into which texts, figures and ideas are carelessly thrown, so that the concept itself loses any distinct and clear meaning. Secondly, because it is hard to find one's bearings in the flood of texts which either themselves aspire to the name of postmodern or are perceived as postmodern. Which of them may serve as model texts for this orientation? Which authors can be counted within the 'postmodernist camp'? Postmodernism is not a school in the traditional sense of the word; it has no leaders accepted by all, no unambiguous interpretation, no ideas assigned without hesitation to its hard core. Thirdly, finally, because from the reading of all those texts which pass for postmodern, and from the study of the views of postmodern authors, there emerges a picture of several different versions of postmodernism — versions, let us add, at least partially contradictory"¹⁰.

Jean-François Lyotard, in his article An Answer to the Question: What is Postmodernism?¹¹, analysing this phenomenon on the planes of art and philosophy, stresses that what decides whether a work or a thought belongs to the postmodern current is not a temporal frame but tendencies of thought and the assumption of a break with the past, as well as the loss of a comprehensive vision of the world: "Finally, let it be clear that it is our business not so much to supply reality as to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented. (…) We have paid enough for the nostalgia for the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the sensible and the concept, for transparent and communicable experience. Under the general demand for relaxation and appeasement, we can hear the desire for a return of terror, for the realisation of the fantasy of seizing reality. The answer is: let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differends, and save the honour of the name"¹².

Among the philosophers with the greatest influence on the shaping of postmodern thought are counted, alongside the already mentioned Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, also Richard Rorty and Jean Baudrillard¹³. In the Polish milieu we may regard Zygmunt Bauman as the principal representative in the field of philosophy. It must be noted, however, that in the Polish context of philosophical thought the postmodern current does not belong to the leading or widely disseminated tendencies¹⁴.

2. The Principal Ideas of Postmodernism

A great difficulty in the general characterisation of the ideological assumptions of postmodernism is that of obtaining a coherent descriptive picture of the phenomenon, for we encounter very large divergences concerning such categories as: precursors, founders and theoreticians, the selection of authors, and the views they present. A further considerable difficulty is the fact that we find a variety of interpretations as to the directions within postmodernism depending on the country or the field in which it occurs¹⁵.

The simplified characterisation of the phenomenon given below is not arbitrary in character. It has been made on the basis of the literature analysing the phenomenon of postmodernism available to the author so far. Taking into account the elements highlighted as common by the majority of authors, the characterisation below will concentrate on two principal points of reference. The first will concern the main philosophical ideas of postmodernism; the second, those postmodern formulations which are tangent to the questions taken up by theological reflection.

2.1. The Philosophical Ideas of Postmodernism

In presenting the principal philosophical assumptions of postmodernism, our attention will concentrate on questions concerning, among other things, the value granted to rational cognition and the very attitude towards human reason. This is strictly bound up with the question of truth, and with the postulate — following from that understanding — which rejects the idea of unity. Textualism will also be characterised as a cognitive method, as will deconstructionism as an attitude adopted towards surrounding reality.

2.1.1. The Negation of the Universality of Reason

One of the principal dimensions of the postmodern style of thinking and philosophising is the turn away from the central postulate of the Enlightenment, which placed in the first position the value of reason and its cognitive powers, "which is able to carry out a rational reconstruction of the state, society, the economy, law, religion, morality and education"¹⁶. Faith in the cognitive powers of reason was founded upon a renewed conception of common notions.

One also observes among contemporary postmodern philosophers disapproval and aversion in their approach to rationalism, which proclaims the cognitive independence of reason, the innateness of concepts and principles, and the granting of primacy to reason over the will¹⁷. This attitude came to be seen as an expression of regression, characterised by a continual dwelling in the past¹⁸. In such an approach one may discern a borrowing from the views of F. Nietzsche, who proclaimed that the human mind does not possess the capacity to know reality as it is — on the contrary, it falsifies it.

Postmodern thinkers incline towards the position that "Enlightenment reason failed theoretically and practically: contingent human reason was unable to fulfil the foundationalist theoretical demands placed upon it, and the practical realisation of the 'Enlightenment project' did not give humanity the expected happiness"¹⁹. They do not accept the possibility of the existence of any single cognitive capacity common to all human beings. They incline towards a radical individualisation and subjectivisation of human cognition, which has value only for the individual performing it: "In the act of knowing, the postmodernists hold, we are not dealing with 'objective truths and realities', but with idealising interpretations and creative language games. The language we employ is by no means a neutral instrument of cognition, for its use is culturally conditioned and evaluative in character"²⁰. The question of the role of language in cognition signalled here will be analysed later.

2.1.2. The Rejection of the Idea of Truth and Objectivity

The consequence which follows from the rejection of the cognitive possibility of objective truths and realities is an inclination towards scepticism, relativism and agnosticism; and from these attitudes there arises a privileged place for the principles of tolerance and pluralism: "The search for a truth independent of the human mind is replaced by dialogue, in which each of the subjects should possess the right to express his own opinion. For the world is so complex, ambiguous and multi-layered that it is not possible to grasp its fundamental structures in any system of thought. Hence the praise, and even the cult, of pluralism in all fields of human culture — from science and philosophy, through aesthetics, to ethics and politics"²¹.

This gives rise to an entirely new conception of philosophy, which is no longer occupied with the search for truth understood as the conformity of man's intellectual cognition with objective reality. According to G. Deleuze, the role of philosophical reflection in postmodernism "consists in 'fantasising', in which the human intellect is stimulated to 'produce' concepts as fleeting as soap bubbles, since they have no unambiguous designates. In consequence, in philosophy of this kind the place of cosmos is taken by chaosmos"²².

Truth, in this conception, has ceased to be a static reality and has taken on a dynamic character. Postmodern philosophers do not perceive the concept of truth unambiguously, and do not even ascribe a positive value to it. At times this conception is carried to peculiar radicalisms, as happens for instance in feminist philosophy, where truth is treated as a masculinist concept towards which a postulate of revision is proclaimed²³.

A further consequence of the negation of objective truth is the postulate which places science founded on rational methodology (such as physics) on a par with all other systems of thought or culturally conditioned ideas. All this is done in the name of that trans-systemic evaluation for which the majority of postmodern thinkers declare themselves. It means the absence of any common foundation upon which one could rely on the plane of interpersonal contact between individuals or societies: "In every case new criteria must be constructed, which will correspond solely and exclusively to particular individual cases. The dialogue constructed in the course of interaction should first of all establish a common range, and on that basis build further relations"²⁴.

Views of this kind, especially in their extreme version²⁵, cannot be confirmed even by a phenomenal observation of reality: "Although in various cultures one may meet diverse assessments of science and technology in the version initiated by the Galileo–Newton revolution, it nevertheless remains an absolute truth that radio-technical devices or spacecraft can function only on the ground of the physics initiated by that revolution, and will not operate on the ground of the physical convictions shared in the culture of the Pygmies or in the beliefs of the Azande"²⁶.

From the postulate demanding the recognition that no single objective truth exists there also follows an attitude of refraining from the evaluation of philosophical systems, placing every philosophy on the same level and making of each an equally legitimate system. In such a conception any critique of the scientific character of the various systems of philosophising likewise disappears — each is in a certain sense the private product of the subject (the human being) who creates it, and as such is unassailable²⁷.

2.1.3. Textualism

Postmodern thinkers, in their reflection on philosophical cognition, devote great attention to the role of language (principally: Jean-François Lyotard, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault²⁸), since it is the only means of expression that exists for the expression of thought, manifesting itself either in writing or in speech. Yet language as such imposes upon us a framework from above, for it situates us within an inherited order of words and their meanings: "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other human beings can do that"²⁹.

On this basis there arose among postmodern philosophers the conception of language games, whose principal precursor is Jean-François Lyotard. Language games are subject to two principal rules: "the rules of their conduct do not find their legitimation in themselves, but belong to the players; the rules are essential by the very fact of the game, for without rules there is no game. (…) In consequence of the language game, every utterance is perceived as a 'move' in a particular game. This leads to a methodology of language which comes down to the expression of speech as combat, consisting in competition (…)"³⁰. When, however, it is a question of seeking truth by means of these games, their application yields no resolution in this case, since there is no common denominator (no rules for conducting the game) which would unite the players. Language thus becomes the creator of the world rather than a neutral medium of cognition, and culture appears as the result of operations upon already existing texts, meanings and metaphors³¹. All of these, however, are of equal rank: "From a given phrase one may pass to others depending on the choice of discourse (…). The application of regimes depends on the discourse; but since there exists no criterion for the choice of discourse (no metadiscourse), every choice is an act of violence against the other possibilities. One must suppose that if a metadiscourse existed, that violence would be legalised by its necessity. The passage from phrase to phrase is in any case never necessary. In particular, the [modernist] superdiscourses of the 'grand narratives', as well as the discourse of [modernist] science, would be acts of violence and 'injustice'"³².

2.1.4. The Rejection of the Idea of Unity

A postulate for which postmodern thinkers declare themselves is the cancellation of the possibility of finding unity: "The postmodern vision which questions the unity and universality of the norms of transcendent rationality is aimed above all at the foundationalist status of the transcendental, general dimension of the I. The attempt is made to replace this dimension with an unsynthesised multiplicity of egological orders coexisting in the human individual, each governed by its own rules, establishing its own semantics and its own symptomatics, and excluding the superiority of any personal centre that would preserve its identity"³³.

This view is founded on a thesis negating the modern position which recognised universal norms of rationality and ascribed to reason the power of unifying and correlating, and of translating into one another, the various ontic-epistemic orders. This operation of reason meant that out of dispersed senses, meanings and values it constituted a rational system of knowledge bound together by a unified logic. This logic was capable of an understanding and meaningful embrace and ordering of everything that exists³⁴.

The postmodernists likewise take a negative attitude towards all attempts undertaken to recover the lost cognitive unity that would order reality: "The postmodern aversion to every kind of foundationalism (centrism) finds its expression in the critique of the great systems of thought and their modes of justification. In philosophy it is directed against metaphysics, which accepts the concept of transcendent and universal truth, and of reality as a certain basis of philosophising (…) today the postmodernists proclaim the end of all systematic and foundational philosophy, seeing neither the possibility nor the sense of solving the traditional philosophical problems (…) seeing no need for a metaphysical perspective on the world, postmodern philosophers prophesy the imminent death of foundational philosophy"³⁵. In consequence of this sceptical attitude towards the efforts to seek unity, one may — following one of its leading representatives, J.-F. Lyotard — count three principal dimensions among the aims of postmodern philosophy.

The first of these is to show that this unity can be achieved only by way of repression within a totalitarian structure. "Every attempt to absolutise truth — the religious included — is generally considered by the postmodernists an attack on the autonomy of the individual. The praise of multiplicity constitutes a new challenge. If modernity, through its accentuation of 'totality', entailed compulsion and even terror, then — in the view of the postmodernists — the flight from the temptation of 'totality' leads to autonomy and to the liberation of diversity"³⁶.

To the second dimension belongs the promotion of pluralism in every sphere of life (not excluding the system of ethical values and worldviews) as the road to building a harmonious society liberated from any forms of domination and compulsion. This promotion belongs to the fundamental values of postmodernism. It is joined with the pressing of the postulate concerning the recognition of the multiculturalism of societies, bound up with the acceptance of their differentiation in confessional, ethnic and worldview terms. Whatever difficulties might stand in the way of realising this postulate, it must never be abandoned. For it is the sole condition of the survival of humanity, which as a result of migration processes is becoming ever more differentiated and ethnically intermixed. The significance of doctrines and dogmas should therefore be diminished, which will bear fruit in a growth of benevolence towards the other, and thereby in the survival of society, protecting it from violence, ethnic cleansing and murder³⁷.

The third dimension is the explanation of the difficulties bound up with the acceptance and functioning of the principles of extreme pluralism, which will inevitably give rise to conflicts³⁸. The realisation of the principles of extreme pluralism, and the guarantee of its functioning in society, finds its means of expression in the attitude of tolerance. The two attitudes are internally coupled: "Pluralism is perceived as 'realised tolerance', and tolerance as 'pluralism in practice'. Pluralism in a sense compels tolerant attitudes and behaviour; tolerance in turn supports diversity in culture, favouring the development of social life"³⁹.

2.1.5. Deconstructionism

The postmodern cognitive method stands in opposition to the modernist method of construction (joining), which was defined by the idea of substantial-worldly reason. That reason conceptualised and ordered the chaos of immediate life experiences. This permitted the gradual rationalisation of the pre-scientific level of existence, and thereby effected the process of humanising various aspects of individual and social life⁴⁰.

This method bore fruit in the creation of the so-called metanarratives — a way of grasping reality characterised by centrism and by the attempt at a comprehensive view in reflection on the world and on the human being and the meaning of his existence. Such a conception, in the view of the postmodernists, was a consequence of the birth of social totalitarianisms such as communism, Nazism or fascism, and also favoured the support of monoculturalism⁴¹.

As a counterweight to such a methodology, the postmodern conception advances the postulate of deconstruction. In this approach the prevailing attitudes are critical, questioning, demythologising, unmasking, destructive. The values which reveal themselves as precious in such an attitude oscillate around extreme individualism, pluralism, unrepeatability and originality:⁴² "According to deconstructive postmodernism, the recognition of any values that would go beyond the context of a particular hic et nunc situation (context transcending) is to constitute a manifestation of an authoritarian approach, in which the totalitarianism of language and reason leads to an apologetics of objectivism in axiology as well as in ethics"⁴³.

The postulate of the rejection of all metanarratives in postmodern reflection is bound up with the adoption of a model of philosophising which will admit only so-called small narratives. These small narratives are "visions of reality arising, as it were, from below, in small human groups. They express the experiences of individuals pushed to the margin, yet offering resistance to the homogenised utopia and operating with a discourse of distance. They do not wish to let themselves be reduced to an instrumental role in the system"⁴⁴.

In contrast to the metanarratives, the approaches of the small narratives are not to occupy themselves with the consideration of such great theses as the existence of God, the meaning of history, the dignity of the human being. Investigating reality and human existence in a fragmentary manner, they undertake no answers to the fundamental questions.

2.2. The Theological Ideas of Postmodernism

Among the postmodern ideas which find a common point of interest with theological reflection — alongside the direct references concerning the existence of God and the place and role of religion — one may count the conception of the human person, as well as the ethical dimension inseparably bound up with human action. The manner in which these questions are understood in postmodern approaches will be presented below.

2.2.1. The Crisis of the Conception of the Human Being

As a result of the assumptions adopted by the postmodernists in connection with philosophical reflection, there emerges from them a picture of the human being who has lost his subjectivity, is deprived of the transcendental dimension, possesses no privileged place in the cosmos, and is merely the resultant of biological evolution or of uncontrolled processes taking place in the subconscious⁴⁵.

The human being in the postmodern conception is oriented exclusively horizontally: guided in his choices by the categories of pragmatism and hedonistic pleasure, he appears at the same time as a being torn between the two extremes by which he is defined in postmodern philosophy. The first of these is determinism, which defines the human being as some resultant of the biological and cultural-social context, in which he practically loses his subjectivity and is stripped of his personal value⁴⁶.

The second, opposite view sees the human being as subject to indeterminism, which manifests itself in ascribing to the human being an unfettered freedom and the capacity to create truth⁴⁷. This great tearing between the two currents gives rise to a peculiar tragedy of humanity: "What remains is the ironic man. (…) the awareness that any thing can be made true or false depending on interpretation causes people not to take themselves seriously. In this perspective contemporary man is incapable of the seriousness of being, for he knows that everything is fragile and condemned to changeability. Only irony remains"⁴⁸.

The postmodern view of the human being characterised as culturalism is an extremely reductionist conception. It sees the human person merely as a cultural product. In such a conception the appeal to the concept of human nature disappears — the nature which constitutes the subjectivity of the human person, and the dignity flowing from it which that person possesses⁴⁹.

A question following from the picture of the human being in the postmodern conception is that of the social system in which such an understanding of the human being would be realised in the most unfettered manner. The values by which society must in that case be characterised are an extremely advanced role for pluralism and tolerance: "There exists nothing that would permit the assessment of anyone's conduct. For this reason no values may be imposed on anyone, nor may anyone be forbidden the performance of the acts he desires. Towards the choices made by other people one must adopt an attitude of respect and esteem. Tolerance, in the conception of the postmodern philosophers, should go so far that no one need justify the decisions he takes either before others or even before himself"⁵⁰. The realisation of such an idea is most feasible in a system of social anarchy, for it presents a vision of freedom unfettered by anything. The second most feasible system is the liberal democratic order, in which the framework of the limits of individual freedom is established by a parliamentary majority, leaving a space of freedom in the sphere of private life so far as it does not violate the freedom of another individual⁵¹.

2.2.2. The Understanding of Ethics

Ethical reflection occupies an important place in the considerations of the postmodernists. This is conditioned by the assumptions concerning the pluralism of values and the adopted conception of unfettered freedom. Both these paradigms must carry inevitable consequences also in the domain of the understanding of ethics, leading to the postulate of creating a morality without ethics⁵². Postmodern ethical reflection can be divided into two different currents of critique of classical normative ethics⁵³.

The first is characterised by the negation of that vision of society which was guided by universal values recognised as binding upon every human person within that society. This universality of norms is irreconcilable with the postulate of the freedom of the person, who has within himself the capacity to go beyond the accepted codes and the particular forms determining him, such as: nationality, sex, social position, group or racial belonging⁵⁴. Such a way of understanding ethical norms leads to the reflection: "In this context one may say that postmodernism is also post-ethical. It is worth noting that the absence of foundations (fundamental principles) in ethics is perceived as a gain for ethics. In their place are inserted basic motives and stimuli, such as: the rehabilitation of sensuality in the moral sphere, the rehabilitation of attachment to place, and the departure from anthropocentrism"⁵⁵.

The second current of critique of the classical conception of ethics is characterised by a much more positive attitude towards rational social frameworks. It perceives the ethos contained in them, as well as the rational character of morality discovered in the principles of behaviour, prescriptions and models in which every human life is immersed⁵⁶. It assumes, however, no cognitive effort to be undertaken by the human being at the level of morality: "For man already exists in that which he seeks; he already has an ethos (understood originally as a dwelling-place — a home of habitation). In such an arrangement, man cannot be bound (framed) by an abstract 'human kind' or by 'reasons/principles', nor by the contingency of desires. In fact he is bound by the practices, codes and representations which organise the historical life in which he is anchored"⁵⁷.

2.2.3. The Situation of Religion — Desacralisation

In attempting to characterise postmodernism in its relation to the phenomenon of religion, a certain complexity of approach to this problematic among the postmodernists comes to light.

According to the conception of one of the principal representatives of this current, Jean-François Lyotard — which speaks of the admissibility only of simplified and fragmentary interpretations of the world — every religious system is treated as a metanarrative attempting to give a comprehensive description of the world, finding answers also to such questions as the meaning of human life, human dignity or the meaning of history, and above all formulating certain theses about the existence of God⁵⁸. For these reasons religions — chiefly Christianity, though also Islam — appear in the postmodern conception as the mainstay of fundamentalism and conservatism. This fundamentalism is understood as the rejection of tendencies which would wish to present faith as something mild, deprived of all tendencies excluding other views and beliefs, and as the lack of acceptance of an attitude which negates or calls into question the meaningfulness of that religion⁵⁹.

Religion, threatening unfettered human freedom, meets with negation and rejection. The postmodernists are unable to accept any established religious system, because every religion "is to be professed decisively, in its full and literal form, without compromises, without softenings, reinterpretations or simplifications. (…) the soul of religion is doctrine rather than ritual, and it can be defined precisely and definitively — which in turn implies its being written down"⁶⁰.

Despite the advancing forms of desacralisation, which are in line with the anti-foundationalist ideological postulate characteristic of postmodernism, one may observe the continual development of the phenomenon of interest in religion and religiosity — especially in its non-institutionalised manifestations, which do not ascribe to themselves an absolutising role in the domain of the knowledge of truth or the determination of ethical norms — sometimes described by the name of the wild sacred. This term, employed by certain historians of religion and sociologists, designates an attitude in which the individual is not characterised by an areligious stance, yet the forms of worship, belief and so on no longer belong to any established religious forms and traditions. Such a religious attitude is closest to gnostic tendencies, though in a much more simplified and commercialised form: "The sacred returns as a renewal of the tradition of esoteric spirituality, but this time in an 'exoteric' form — that is, an esotericism which is the object of mass publications in the mass media. Here appears a paradoxical contradiction: what was the secret of the great initiates is now the object of knowledge sold in cheap brochures and popularised in certain therapeutic circles"⁶¹.

The phenomenon of religiosity is not negated or combated by the postmodernists, but accepted only under certain conditions: postmodernism — speaking of it with a certain simplification on account of its "not fully determined character — admits religious rituals and ceremonies, yet works consistently towards the elimination of religion from the public sphere. It denies religion the right to a voice and to functioning in public life"⁶².

In writing of the situation of religion in postmodernism, it is worth signalling the influence this current of thought has on the change in the understanding of the idea of God and of the relationship to Him. Researchers of this phenomenon state that "the changes in the conception of God among contemporary people, especially the young, move in the direction of an impersonal God. God becomes nature, energy, some indeterminate metaphysical instance (…) The personal God gives way to the feeling and experiencing of the 'sacred' as an emotional state"⁶³.

It should also be added that in postmodern references to religion the conception of the death of God, formulated in the nineteenth century by Friedrich Nietzsche, remains continually alive⁶⁴. It goes hand in hand with the acceptance by some postmodern thinkers of the attitude of nihilism, which gives birth to the negation of the existence of God: "The watchword of nihilism has been cast: the words 'Gott ist tot', God is dead — say at once that one can no longer believe in God and that one can believe in nothing. Nothing has meaning any more; that is, one can adhere to none of the values, because all the values substituted in the place of God lose their value, and human life is without significance"⁶⁵.

Summary

The postmodern conception does not embrace with its influence the whole of contemporary philosophy, nor of culture, though some authors try to suggest as much⁶⁶. Yet neither the presence of this current nor its influence should be underestimated, for it penetrates into various fields: into scientific cognition, and into contemporary culture as a whole: "Postmodern art or postmodern philosophy may often seem to us bizarre, contrived, excessively abstract — but, say its researchers, let us not be deceived by appearances. Their ultimate source is a world without metaphysics, without absolute meaning and without ultimate mystery; and precisely such a world is the lot of the lives of millions of people who do not read Derrida, who have never heard of Greenaway, and who perhaps would never come to like postmodern art or philosophy"⁶⁷.

The above presentation of the principal assumptions of the postmodern current — on philosophical ground as well as with reference to the realities taken up by theological thought — has permitted us to sketch the intellectual and cultural situation in which the contemporary Church exists as it carries out its missionary work. This presentation of the postmodern context will permit the formulation of a conclusion concerning the possibility (or its absence) of conducting the Church's missionary work in accordance with postmodern assumptions.

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Notes

¹ Cf. Z. Sareło, *Postmodernizm w pigułce*, Poznań 1998, p. 5. ↩

² Cf. S. Wielgus, *Postmodernizm jako współczesne wyzwanie wobec podstaw kultury euroatlantyckiej i chrystianizmu*, [in:] *Tertio millennio adveniente*, G. Witaszek (ed.), Lublin 2000, p. 340. ↩

³ Cf. A. Bronk, *Postmodernizm*, [in:] *Leksykon teologii fundamentalnej*, M. Rusecki; K. Kaucha; I. Ledwoń (ed.), Lublin-Kraków 2002, p. 929. ↩

⁴ Cf. H. Janaszek-Ivaničková, *Nowa twarz postmodernizmu*, Katowice 2002, p. 20. ↩

⁵ Cf. A. Bronk, *Postmodernizm*, op. civol. ↩

⁶ Cf. A. Szahaj, *Co to jest postmodernizm*, „Ethos" 1996 no. 1-2, p. 78. ↩

⁷ Cf. Z. Sareło, *Postmodernistyczny styl myślenia i życia*, [in:] *Postmodernizm, wyzwanie dla chrześcijaństwa*, Z. Sareło (ed.), Poznań 1995, p. 9. ↩

⁸ Cf. A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć świat współczesny*, Lublin 1998, p. 24. ↩

⁹ See M. Chmielewski., *Postmodernizm*, [in:] *Leksykon duchowości katolickiej*, M. Chmielewski (ed.), Lublin-Kraków 2002, p. 685. ↩

¹⁰ A. Szahaj, *Co to jest\...,* op. cit., p. 63. ↩

¹¹ See J. Lyotard, *Odpowiedź na pytanie: co to jest postmodernizm?,* trans. M.P. Markowski [in:]\ ↩

¹² Ibid. s. 61. ↩

¹³ Cf. Z. Sareło, *Postmodernizm\...,* op. cit., p. 12-23. ↩

¹⁴ R. Legutko, *Postmodernizm*, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej \[online\], dostęp: 2009-12-04 \. ↩

¹⁵ Cf. A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć\...,* op. cit., p. 27. ↩

¹⁶ H. Jakuszko, *Oświeceniowa filozofia*, [in:] *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, T. VII,  A. Maryniarczyk (ed.), Lublin 2006, p. 906. ↩

¹⁷ Cf. H. Kiereś i B**. **Paź, *Racjonalizm*, [in:] *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, T. VIII,  A. Maryniarczyk (ed.), Lublin 2006, p. 600. ↩

¹⁸ Cf. Z. Sareło, *Postmodernizm\...,* op. cit., p. 12-23. ↩

¹⁹ A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć\...,* op. cit., p. 54. ↩

²⁰ Ibid., p. 56-57. ↩

²¹ A. Drozd, *Permisywizm moralny*, Kielce 2005, p. 275. ↩

²² Z. Sareło, *Postmodernistyczny styl\...,* op. cit., p. 11. ↩

²³ Cf. A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć\...,* op. cit., p. 54. ↩

²⁴ R. Geisler, *Jednostka i społeczeństwo w postmodernizmie*, Częstochowa 1999, p. 49. ↩

²⁵ Cf. A. Kołakowska, *Czy możliwa jest religia postmodernistyczna*?, „Znak" 2001 no. 1, p. 50. ↩

²⁶ J. Życiński, *Bóg postmodernistów*, Lublin 2001, p. 97-98. ↩

²⁷ Cf. Z. Sareło, Postmodernizm\..., op. cit., p. 8. ↩

²⁸ Cf. H. Kiereś, *Postmodernizm*, op. cit., p. 387-390. ↩

²⁹ R. Rorty, *Przygodność, ironia, solidarność*, trans. W. Popowski, Warszawa 1996, p. 117. ↩

³⁰ Cf. D. Kulesza, *Dyskurs filozofii postmodernistycznej*, Katowice 2006, p. 153. ↩

³¹ Cf. A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć\...*, op. cit., p. 60. ↩

³² B. Baran, *Postmodernizm*, Kraków 1992, p. 172. ↩

³³ H. Perkowska, *Postmodernizm a metafizyka*, Warszawa 2003, p. 81. ↩

³⁴ Ibid., p. 81. ↩

³⁵ Cf. A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć\...,* op. cit., p. 78. ↩

³⁶ J. Mariański, *Religia i Kościół między tradycją i ponowoczesnością. Studium socjologiczne*,  Kraków 1997, p. 40. ↩

³⁷ Cf. H. Janaszek-Ivaničková, *Nowa twarz...*, op. cit., p. 310. ↩

³⁸ Cf. Z. Sareło, *Postmodernistyczny styl\...*, op. cit., p. 13. ↩

³⁹ W. Zieliński, *Status etyki w kulturze ponowoczesnej*, Toruń 2001, p. 75-76. ↩

⁴⁰ Cf. H. Perkowska, *Postmodernizm a metafizyka*, Warszawa 2003, p. 22. ↩

⁴¹ Cf. H. Kiereś, *Dekonstrukcjonizm*, *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, T. II, Lublin 2006, A. Maryniarczyk (ed.), p. 464-465. ↩

⁴² Cf. A. Bronk, *Krajobraz postmodernistyczny*, „Ethos" 1996 no. 1-2, p. 89. ↩

⁴³ J. Życiński, *Bóg\...,* op. cit., p. 88. ↩

⁴⁴ H. Janaszek-Ivaničková, *Od modernizmu do postmodernizmu*, Katowice 1996, p. 101. ↩

⁴⁵ Cf. A. Bronk, *Krajobraz\...*, op. cit., p. 89. ↩

⁴⁶ Cf. J. Życiński, *Bóg\...*, op. cit., p. 74. ↩

⁴⁷ Cf. H. Kiereś, *U podstaw życia społecznego, personalizm czy socjalizm*, Radom 2001, p. 32. ↩

⁴⁸ A. Kobyliński, *Światopogląd w kontekście postmodernizmu*, „Ateneum Kapłańskie" 2004 no. 3(371), ↩

⁴⁹ Cf. T. Egaleton, *Iluzje postmodernizmu*, Warszawa 1998, p. 103-105. ↩

⁵⁰ Z. Sareło, *Postmodernizm\...,* op. cit., p. 11. ↩

⁵¹ Cf. H. Kiereś, *U podstaw...*, dz. cyt, p. 35. ↩

⁵² Cf. Z. Sareło, *Postmodernistyczny styl\...,* op. cit., p. 23. ↩

⁵³ Cf. F. De Watcher, *Post-Modern Challenges to Ethics*, „Ethical Perspectives" 1994 no. 1, p. 79-81. ↩

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 80. ↩

⁵⁵ P. Bortkiewicz, *Postmodernistyczna destrukcja kultury moralnej*, [in:] *Postmodernizm, wyzwanie dla chrześcijaństwa*, Poznań 1995, p. 32. ↩

⁵⁶ Cf. F. De Watcher, *Post-Modern Challenges...*, op. cit., p. 79. ↩

⁵⁷ P. Bortkiewicz, *Postmodernistyczna destrukcja...* op. cit., p. 33. ↩

⁵⁸ Cf. J. Życiński, *Bóg\...*, op. cit., p. 36. ↩

⁵⁹ Cf. E. Gellner, *Postmodernizm, rozum i religia*, Warszwa 1997, p. 11-12. ↩

⁶⁰ Ibid. s. 11. ↩

⁶¹ J. Kłoczowski, *Chrześcijanin XXI wieku*, „Znak" 1995, no. 3, p. 57. ↩

⁶² S. Wielgus, *Postmodernizm jako\...,* op. cit., p. 346. ↩

⁶³ B. Kostrubiec, *Badania empiryczne obrazu siebie i obrazu Boga u zwolenników postmodernizmu*,  Lublin 2004, p. 146-147. ↩

⁶⁴ Cf. J.Życiński, *Bóg\...*, op. cit., p. 37. ↩

⁶⁵ W. Szydłowska, *Nihilizm i dekonstrukcja*, Warszawa 2003, p. 96. ↩

⁶⁶ Cf. A. Bronk, *Krajobraz\...*, op. cit., p. 98. ↩

⁶⁷ R. Legutko, *Postmodernizm\...,* op. civol. ↩